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CALIFORNIA CHOICE OF LAW IN TORT: DEMISE OF
LEX LOCI DELICTI-REICH V. PURCELL
It has been the general rule for many years that the law of the
place where an injury occurs determines the existence and extent of
any tort liability growing out of that injury regardless of where suit
is brought.' This mechanical rule has not provided sufficient flex-
ibility2 to produce what the courts have deemed to be the "just"3
result in all cases. For example, suppose state A limits recovery in
suits for wrongful death to a maximum of $10,000 whereas State B
places no restriction on recovery in such suits. If two vacationing
residents of state B collide in state A with the resulting death of
one of them, must recovery in a suit for wrongful death brought in
state B be limited to $10,000? Application of the traditional rule
would dictate an affirmative answer even though the only contact
with state B was the fortuitous circumstance that the accident oc-
curred there.4 The purpose of this note is to examine judicial treat-
ment of this rule, with particular emphasis on the changing state of
the law in California.
The Rule of Lex Loci Delicti
At an early date American courts developed the maxim that the
law of the state where the injury occurred should supply the rules
determinative of the rights and liabilities growing out of that injury.5
Due to the fondness of early jurists to couch their maxims in Latin
the rule came to be known as lex loci delicti (the law of the place of
the wrong).6 The lex loci rule was based on the theory that al-
though the law of the foreign jurisdiction (the place of the wrong)
was of no force outside its boundaries, an act or omission proscribed
by its law occurring within those boundaries created a right or obli-
gation which any forum state was obligated to enforce.7
1 See, e.g., Slater v. Mexican Nat'l. R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224
N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws
§§ 377-90 (1934).
2 Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and
Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361, 381 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Cheatham];
Weintraub, A Method For Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q.
215, 216 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Weintraub].
3 D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESs 66, 79 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as CAVERS]; Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automa-
tion in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205, 209-10 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as Currie, Survival], in B. CuRu, SELECTE EssAys ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 128, 132-33 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CuMUE, EssAys]; Weintraub,
supra note 2, at 216.
4 See, e.g., Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 728 (1958),
discussed in text accompanying notes 63-67 infra; Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N.C.
286, 171 S.E. 82 (1933).
5 Cases cited note 1 supra.
6 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 12(1) (1967).
7 Cheatham, supra note 2, at 365.
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The lex loci rule was based on a strictly territorial theory of law.s
The state where the allegedly tortious conduct occurred was thought
to have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the existence and extent
of any legal rights growing out of any act within its boundaries.9
The law of the place of the wrong was given no effect in a foreign
forum state.10 Instead, it was theorized that an obligation or right
was created in the state of the injury which became vested in the
plaintiff and accompanied him to any other state where he might
bring suit.:" It was this foreign-created right or obligation based on
the entire block of foreign laws which the forum state was obligated
to enforce. 12 Thus when suit was brought in a state other than the
place of injury, the forum court was governed strictly by the foreign-
created right.13 This theory of enforcement of the foreign-created
right is known as the vested-rights theory of conflict of laws.
14
The lex loci rule was favored since it provided certainty and
uniformity of result,15 defeating any possible advantage to be gained
by forum shopping.'6 It was possessed of the further virtue of ease
of application.
17
The rule produced an acceptable result in the simple case when
all the elements and contacts comprising the tort occurred in one
state and the only contact with the forum state was the fact that it
was the place where suit was brought.' 8 However, when the tort
involved various foreign contacts the result was often arbitrary and
sometimes unjust.19  In application of the lex loci rule to a tort
with multistate contacts, the law of the place of the wrong was ap-
plied without any assessment of the significance of the fact that
the tort occurred where it did or any rational examination of the
possible interests of other states in the decision of the issues in-
volved.20  The rule lacked the flexibility to take these factors into
account.
An example of the type of unjust result which the lex loci rule
can produce is provided by the case of Carter v. Tillery.2 1 In this
8 Id.
9 W. CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 319
(1942) [hereinafter cited as W. COoK]; Cheatham, supra note 2, at 379;
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377, Comment a (1934).
10 Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 254 (1933); Slater v. Mexican Nat'1 R.R.,
194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904); Cheatham, supra note 2, at 365-66.
11 See authorities cited note 1 supra.
12 There is no general agreement as to the source of this obligation to
enforce the foreign-created right. Cheatham, supra note 2, at 382.
13 Id. at 381.
14 Id. at 363.
15 Comment, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws in California, 1
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 365, 367-68 (1954).
16 Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 523, 329 P.2d 728, 731 (1958);
Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CoNTEVP.
PROB. 679, 687 (1963).
17 Cheatham, supra note 2, at 379.
18 Id.; W. CooK, supra note 9, at 313.
19 Weintraub, supra note 2, at 216.
20 CAVERS, supra note 3, at 65; 2 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 333-35 (1947);
STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 182-85 (3d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as
STUMBERG].
21 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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case the plaintiff was a guest in the defendant's private airplane.
The plane trip originated in New Mexico and was intended to termi-
nate at El Paso, Texas. However, the plane flew off course and landed
in Mexico. While attempting to take off again the plane crashed in
Mexico and the plaintiff was injured. Both the plaintiff and the
defendant were residents of Texas, the state where the suit was
brought. The Texas court held the law of the place of the wrong,
Mexico, to be controlling. As a result the plaintiff was denied any
recovery since the court found the remedy supplied by the law of
Mexico to be so dissimilar from that afforded by the Texas courts
that it could not be applied.
22
Incensed by cases like Tillery, critics of the lex loci rule attacked
the validity of the underlying vested rights theory.23 It was sug-
gested that a court could not enforce an obligation created by the
laws of another jurisdiction but could only enforce obligations it cre-
ated itself.24 Under this theory, called the local law theory, the forum
was said to have created an obligation which it patterned after the
obligation which the place of the wrong would create.25 For example,
if suit was brought in state B on an act or omission which occurred
in state A, the right which the court of state B enforced was theorized
to be a right created by state B itself, which it chose to pattern after
22 Apparently the plaintiff could not bring suit in Mexico since Amer-
ican citizens were not amenable to suits in that country. Stumberg, "The
Place of Wrong" Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 34 WASH. L. REv. 388, 390
(1959).
23 See, e.g., G. CHEsiaRE, PRIVATE INTERATIONAL LAw 32-34 (1957); W.
Coor, supra note 9, at 311-46; E. LoRENzEN, SELECTED ARTiCLES ON THE CoN-
FLICT oF LAws 364 (1947); Cheatham, supra note 2, at 381; Cook, The Juris-
diction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws, 31 COLum. L. REV. 368
(1931); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33
YALE L.J. 736 (1924); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REv. 881
(1951); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws-Foreign Created Rights, 8 TEXAs L. REV.
173 (1935); Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE
L.J. 468 (1928).
"The basic theme running through the attacks on the lex loci delicti rule
is that wooden application of a few overly simple rules, based on the out-
moded vested rights theory cannot solve the complex problems which arise
in modern litigation and may often yield harsh, unnecessary and unjust
results." 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 12(2) (1967).
24 The two classic statements of the local law theory are those made by
Judge Learned Hand and by Professor Walter Wheeler Cook: "[N]o court
can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign, and when a suitor comes
to a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he can only invoke an obli-
gation recognized by that sovereign. A foreign sovereign under civilized law
imposes an obligation of its own as nearly homologous as possible to that
arising in the place where the tort occurs." Guinness v. Miller, 291 F. 769,
770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). "[T]he forum, when confronted by a case involving
foreign elements, always applies its own law to the case, but in doing so
adopts and enforces as its own law a rule of decision identical, or at least
highly similar though not identical, in scope with a rule of decision found in
the system of law in force in another state or country with which some or
all of the foreign elements are connected .... The forum thus enforces not
a foreign right but a right created by its own law." W. CooK, supra note 9,
at 20-21.
25 See authorities cited note 24 supra; Cheatham, supra note 2, at 367-68,
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the right which state A would create. The forum was no longer
thought of as enforcing a foreign right but merely one of its own
creation. It might appear to be merely a matter of semantics to
argue whether the forum enforces the foreign-created right or one of
its own creation which it chooses to pattern after the foreign right.
However, it is important in imparting the opportunity for greater
flexibility by the forum in determining the rights and liabilities of
the parties. 26 This is true since at some time the forum may not
choose to pattern the right it creates after the foreign-created right.
The local law theory provided the theoretical opportunity to avoid
application of the law of the place of wrong. However, because lex
loci was firmly entrenched in American law, few courts were willing
to completely disregard the rule prior to the 19601S.27 Instead, some
courts sought and found methods of attaining flexibility without over-
ruling the lex loci rule when its mechanical application would have
produced an unconscionable result.
28
Methods of Avoiding Lex Loci Without Overruling
That the law of the place of the wrong is to be applied is only a
partial statement of the lex loci rule, which might be more fully
stated as follows: In tort cases the forum will apply the substantive
law of the place of the wrong if that substantive law is not contrary
to the public policy of the forum.29 It follows that there are three
approaches which a court may use to avoid application of the rule
in determining a particular issue in a case: (1) the court can find that
application of the foreign rule would offend public policy; (2) the
issue can be characterized as one of procedural law rather than sub-
stantive law; or (3) the issue can be characterized as something
other than a tort issue.
Courts have hesitated to hold the law of the place of the wrong
inapplicable as against the public policy of the forum.3 0 This is
apparently true since such a holding strongly implies that the forum
believes that the laws of the other state do not come up to its own
minimal standards of fairness and justice.3 1 Thus courts have not
applied the public policy exception unless application of the foreign
rule offends "some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, or some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal. 13 2 As one court has stated, the foreign rule must be
26 STUMBERG, supra note 20, at 15.
27 E.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 A.C. 560, 562, 432 P.2d 727, 729, 63 Cal. Rptr.
31, 33 (1967); Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.
2d 814 (1959). See also, Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and
the Federal Courts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 732, 733-34 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Cavers, Changing].
28 See text accompanying notes 29-41 infra.
29 16 Am. JuR. 2D Conflict of Laws §§ 71, 74 (1964).
30 See Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56
COLTJm. L. REV. 969 (1956).
31 Id. 969-71. Avoiding application of the substantive law of another
state through use of the characterization devices of the remaining two excep-
tions may carry a similar implication. However, since it is not as direct, the
implication would be weaker and thus likely to be less offensive.
32 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
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"pernicious and detestable"3 3 before the forum will refuse to apply
it for public policy reasons.
The second approach arises from the fact that the lex loci rule
requires only that the substantive law of the place of the wrong be
applied.34 The forum is free to apply its own rules of procedure.
35
Consequently, courts began to characterize certain issues as matters
of procedure which were deemed substantive for other purposes.
Among those issues characterized as procedural have been statutes
of frauds, 36 measure of damages 37 and survival of a tort claim.
3 8
The third approach involves a similar analysis where issues which
possibly could be termed tort issues are characterized by the court as
belonging to another area of the law which does not apply the Zex
loci rule for choice of law. For example, liability for damages
caused by driving a rented car has been characterized as a contractual
issue governed by the state where the contract was made rather
than an issue of tort governed by the law of the place of the wrong.3 9
Similarly, a railway company's liability to a passenger for injuries
resulting from a collision has been held to be contractual since the
injury was a violation of defendant's obligation to carry the plain-
tiff safely to her destination.4 0 And the ability of a child to sue
his parent for allegedly tortious conduct has been deemed an issue of
family law governed by the law of the domicile.
41
It was primarily through the characterization device of these
latter two approaches that courts injected some flexibility into choice
of law in torts by avoiding application of the law of the place of
the wrong when it would lead to what was thought to be an un-
desirable result.42 In order to attain this added flexibility the courts
were often required to use somewhat questionable reasoning. 43 In
33 Veytia v. Alvarez, 30 Ariz. 316, 318, 247 P. 117, 118 (1926).
34 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 12(1) (1967).
35 STUMBERG, supra note 20, at 133.
30 Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 210 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1883).
37 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). The New York Court of Appeals retracted the pro-
cedural basis of the decision in Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 396, 183 N.E.2d
902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
38 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953), discussed in
text accompanying notes 54-59 infra.
39 Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163
(1928).
40 Justis v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 12 Cal. App. 639, 108 P. 328 (1910).
41 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), discussed in text
accompanying notes 60-62 infra.
42 See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
1959 DuKE L.J. 171, 175 [hereinafter cited as Currie, Notes], in CURarE,
EssAys, supra note 3, at 181; Currie, Survival, supra note 3, at 132-33.
"The result of applying a single rule [lex loci] in so many different con-
texts has often been irrational, and worse unjust, decisions. Sporadically, a
court has departed from the rigid standard rule to reach what it sensed was
a just result. Too often, however, the 'reasons' articulated by courts for such
departures have been so patently irrational and arbitrary as to invite wide-
spread criticism of a proper result and make the choice between the disease
and cure a difficult one." Weintraub, supra note 2, at 216.
43 E.g., for a criticism of the reasoning in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,
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attacking this method of providing flexibility under the lex loci
rule one legal scholar has noted that "it is a poor defense of the
system to say that the unacceptable results that it will inevitably
produce can be averted by disingenuousness if the courts are suf-
ficiently alert.
'44
As mentioned above, one of the main advantages of the lex loci
rule was stated to be the predictability and uniformity of decision it
provided choice of law problems in tort.45 However, since there was
no certainty that a particular court would not stretch and bend the
facts to meet one of the exceptions to the rule, uniformity of result
was by no means assured.
46
Thus with the combined factors of the continuing, and perhaps
increasing47 need for flexibility,48 the criticism of the reasoning be-
ing employed to achieve flexibility through the exceptions to lex
loci,49 the decrease in predictability supplied by lex loci 5° and the in-
creased acceptance of the local law theory,5' the stage was set for
states to eliminate completely the rule of lex loci delicti. Some did.
The turn of the decade marked the beginning of the end for lex loci
delicti.
52
Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), see Leflar, 1961
N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 29, 43-45; Weintraub, supra note 2, at
244-48; Note, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 637 (1961). For a criticism of the reasoning in
Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953), see Note, 68 HAv. L.
Rv. 1260 (1955); Recent Decisions, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1288 (1954); Note, 27 S.
CAL. L. REV. 468 (1954); Note, 1 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 380 (1954). But see Currie,
Survival, supra note 3, at 209-10.
44 Currie, Notes, supra note 42, at 176. Professor Currie prefaced the
quoted material by stating: "A sensitive and ingenious court can detect an
absurd result and avoid it; I am inclined to think that this has been done
more often than not and that therein lies a major reason why the system has
managed to survive. At the same time, we constantly run the risk that the
court may lack sensitivity and ingenuity; we are handicapped in even pre-
senting the issue in its true light; and instances of mechanical application of
the rules to produce indefensible results are by no means rare." Id. at 175.
45 Text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
46 See Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 206 (2d Cir.
1955) (dissenting opinion); Currie, Notes, supra note 42, at 175.
47 Some feel that with advances in the technology of communication,
trade and travel the number of cases involving multistate contacts will in-
crease. See, e.g., CAVERS, supra note 3, at 12, 115.
48 Text accompanying note 20 supra.
49 Note 43 supra.
50 Text accompanying note 46 supra.
51 See Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARv. L. REV. 822, 823
(1950); Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 ILL.
L.F. 230, 234.
52 See, e.g., Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); W.H.
Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945); Wessling v. Paris,
417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966);
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963);
Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Ore. 1967); Griffith v.
United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Haumschild v. Continen-
tal Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). See also RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
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Lex Loci Delicti in California
The California court at an early date adopted the lex loci rule
for choice of law in tort cases.53 Later it became a leader among
those courts avoiding the rule's application to prevent an unjust re-
sult.54 In Grant v. McAuliffe55 the California Supreme Court heard
a case which called for application of the lex loci rule but which, if
applied, would have defeated the legitimate interests of the California
residents involved. Application of the law of the place of the wrong
would have denied the California plaintiffs a cause of action against
the estate of the driver of the automobile which injured them in a
collision in Arizona.56 The estate was being administered in Cal-
ifornia and all parties including the decedent were California resi-
dents.5 7 To apply the Arizona rule that a cause of action does not
survive the death of the tortfeasor would seem to serve no purpose
other than merely deciding the case.58 The California court appar-
ently felt that denying the injured California residents recovery
under these circumstances would be unjust; consequently, survival of
a cause of action was characterized as procedural rather than sub-
stantive and California law allowing the suit was applied,59 de-
spite much authority in California and elsewhere that such a sur-
vival aspect is a substantive element of the cause of action.
60
The next year California applied another characterization de-
vice in the case of Emery v. Emery.61 California characterized the
issue of the capacity of a child to sue his parent for the latter's
allegedly tortious conduct not to be an element of tort law, but rather
a question of family law governed by the law of the domicile.6 2 In
order to prevent the fortuitous and irrelevant place of injury from
determining the result the lex loci rule was held not applicable.63
Thus, it seemed that the lex loci rule, as modified by the charac-
terization devices, might provide adequate flexibility for California
law. However, despite these instances of avoidance of application of
the lex loci delicti rule in order to avoid unjust results, the rule was
applied in 1957 to produce what seems to have been an unjust result.
This was the case of Victor v. Sperry, 4 involving a collision in Mexico
53 See Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon Co., 153 Cal. 438, 95 P. 862 (1908);
Duluz v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 177 Cal. 465, 170 P. 1133 (1913); Loranger v.
Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932).
54 See CAvERS, supra note 3, at 62; Gorfinkel, Conflict of Laws-A Survey
of Past and Contemporary Theory, 16 HAsTINGs L.J. 21, 21-22 (1964).
55 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
56 Id. at 862, 264 P.2d at 946.
57 Id. at 861, 264 P.2d at 946.
58 Currie, Survival, supra note 3, at 215.
59 41 Cal. 2d at 864-65, 264 P.2d at 948.
60 E.g., Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387 (1933); Cort v. Steen, 36 Cal. 2d
437, 224 P.2d 723 (1950); Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 A. 691 (1928);
RESTATEMMNT OF CONLICT or LAWS § 390 (1934).
61 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
62 Id. at 428, 289 P.2d at 223.
63 Id.; see Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L.
RLv. 719, 732 (1961), in Cutoux, EssAYs supra note 3 at 642.
64 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 728, petition for hearing denied, id. at
520? 329 P.2d at 733 (1958) (Carter, J. dissenting).
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of two autos owned and operated by California residents. Plaintiff
suffered damage to his spinal cord resulting in permanent partial
paralysis.0 5 The California trial court assessed plaintiff's actual dam-
ages at $40,462.66 Damages allowable under Mexican law were com-
puted at $6,135.67 The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's
application of the lex loci rule and limited recovery to the lower
amount merely because the negligent act and injury had occurred
in Mexico.6
California Abrogation of Lex Loci Delicti
In the 1967 case of Reich v. Purcell,69 California, following the
lead of several other states,70 overruled its former cases relying on
the lex loci delicti rule.
Like the Victor case, Reich involved a limitation on the damages
that could be recovered. An automobile driven by the California
defendant collided in Missouri with another automobile operated by
plaintiff's wife, a resident of Ohio, who was killed in the accident.
7 1
The parties stipulated that judgment for the wrongful death be en-
tered in the amount of $55,000 or $25,000, depending on whether the
$25,000 limitation on recovery for wrongful death in the Missouri
wrongful death statute was applicable.7 2 California, the forum state
and state of defendant's domicile, had no limitation on recovery for
wrongful death.73  Ohio, the place of the domicile of plaintiff and of
the decedent and place of administration of decedent's estate, also
placed no limit on damages.
7 4
Noting the invalidity of the vested rights theory and the lex loci
rule,75 the court stated that California had not in the past applied the
lex loci rule when its application "would defeat the interests of the
litigants and of the states concerned. ' 76 To illustrate this point the
court cited 77 both the Grant and the Emery cases, making no mention
of the characterization devices which were the apparent bases for
each of these decisions.
78
The Reich opinion indicated that the uniformity of decision sup-
plied by the lex loci rule should not be an overriding element in
65 Id. at 520, 329 P.2d at 729.
66 Id. at 520, 329 P.2d at 730.
67 Id. at 521, 329 P.2d at 730. The Mexican law in effect at that time
restricted recovery for temporary total disability to 75 per cent of his lost
wages for a period not to exceed 1 year, with no wages in excess of 25 pesos
($2.00) a day to be taken into account. For permanent and total disability,
lost earnings not to exceed 25 pesos per day for 918 days were allowed. Id.
68 Id. at 524, 329 P.2d at 732.
69 67 A.C. 560, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
70 See cases cited note 52 supra.
71 67 A.C. at 561, 432 P.2d at 728, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
72 Id. at 561-62, 432 P.2d at 728-29, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 32-33.
78 Id. at 561-62, 432 P.2d at 728, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 562, 432 P.2d at 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
76 Id. at 562-63, 432 P.2d at 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
77 Id.
78 See text accompanying notes 55-63 supra.
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choice of law.79 In addition, it stated that with more states abandon-
ing lex Zoci each year the very uniformity that once was its primary
virtue was now disappearing.80 The court then expressly overruled
the Zex loci doctrine. 8 '
If No Lex Loci-What?
With the passing of the lex loci rule there is created a void
which must be filled by an alternative method of deciding which law
to apply to determine the outcome of cases involving torts with
multistate contacts. The current problem for other courts and
for legal practitioners is how this determination is to be made
in the future. The guidelines laid down by Reich are few. The
opinion merely states that the forum "must consider all of the for-
eign and domestic elements and interests involved . . . to determine
the rule applicable. '8 2 The opinion does indicate, by example, how
those elements and interests are to be examined.
The court identified the elements as follows: Ohio was the resi-
dence of plaintiffs and their decedents at the time of the accident
and the place of administration of the decedents' estates; Missouri
was the place of the wrong; and California was the residence of de-
fendant and the forum state.8 3 The only issue to be decided was
the measure of damages to be applied.8 4 Neither Ohio nor California
placed a restriction on the amount of damages recoverable in a wrong-
ful death action,8 5 while Missouri placed a $25,000 limit on recovery in
such actions.8 6
The opinion then proceeded to examine the interests of the re-
spective states to determine which states' policies would be furthered
by application of their respective laws.8 T  It was determined that
it would serve no purpose for the California court to apply its rule
that there is no limitation on damages.88 The policy behind such a
provision is apparently to assure that survivors who are California
residents will be adequately compensated for their loss. 9 Since at
the time of the tort the plaintiff-survivors were not California resi-
dents the policy behind the California law would not be furthered by
its application.9  However, the court found that the policy of the
79 67 A.C. at 564, 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
88 Id.
84 Id. at 561, 432 P.2d at 728, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
85 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19a; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 377.
86 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.090 (Vernon Supp. 1966).
87 67 A.C. at 564-65, 432 P.2d 730-31, 63 Cal. Rptr. 34-35. The reference
to examination of each state's "policy" is in the terminology used by Currie.
Currie, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict
of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212, 1233, 1242 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Currie, Comment]. Cavers prefers, as more precise, a reference to the "pur-
poses" of the conflicting laws. CAVERS, supra note 3, at 98.
88 67 A.C. at 564-65, 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
89 See CAVERS, supra note 3, at 151.
90 67 A.C. at 564-65, 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34. It should be
noted that the plaintiffs moved to California after the accident and were
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Ohio law in affording full recovery to survivors was furthered by
its application in this case since the plaintiff-survivors were Ohio resi-
dents at the time of the tort.9 1
The remaining question was whether Missouri, the place of
wrong, also had an interest in application of its law limiting re-
covery to $25,000. The court concluded it would not further the policy
behind the Missouri law nor any other Missouri policy to apply the
limitation on damages in this particular case. 2  The limitation
on wrongful death damages was established to avoid imposition of
excessive damages on Missouri defendants. 93  Since the defendant
in this case was a resident of California, it seems that Missouri
would have no interest in limiting his liability merely because the
accident fortuitously occurred in Missouri rather than elsewhere.
9 4
Thus the conflict of laws problem became no problem at all since
there was no conflict. Only one state, of the states which had some
contact with the case, had an interest in application of its law.
The only rational result would be to apply the law of that state.9 5
This type of case, where there are several states whose law might
be applied because of contacts with the tort, but only a single state
whose policies would be furthered by application of its law has been
termed a "false conflict" case.9 6 The Reich example should be a
partial guide for practitioners and lower courts when future false
conflict cases arise. However, other more complicated situations re-
main subject to uncertain resolution in California. An analysis of
the apparent source of the reasoning in Reich may indicate the
path to be followed in the future.
Governmental-Interest Theory
The Reich method of solving tort problems with multistate con-
tacts is similar to a portion of a proposed "governmental-interest"
97
approach which has been summarized in part as follows:
1. [Policy analysis step] When a court is asked to apply the law of
a foreign state different from the law of the forum, it should inquire
into the policies expressed in the respective laws, and into the cir-
cumstances in which it is reasonable for the respective states to assert
California residents at the time of suit. The California court took the position
that residence at the time of the accident is to be determinative in assessing
governmental interests. Accord, Gore v. Northeast Airlines, 373 F.2d 717, 723
(2d Cir. 1967) reversing the district court which had refused to apply New
York law in favor of a New York decedent's widow merely because she moved
to another state after the accident and before bringing suit.
91 67 A.C. at 565, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
92 Id.; see Weintraub, supra note 2, at 228.
93 Dove v. Stafford, 230 Mo. App. 241, 246, 91 S.W.2d 161, 164 (1936).
94 See CAVERS, supra note 3, at 299; Weintraub, supra note 2, at 216.
95 See Cavers, Changing, supra note 27, at 733; Currie, The Disinterested
Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 756 (1963).
96 Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 267, 270 n.19 (1966).
97 The term "governmental-interest" is the one used by Professor Currie.
Currie, Comment, supra note 87, at 1241. The use of this term has been
criticized as misleading and inaccurate. See A. EHRNZWEIG, CONFUCT or LAwS
350 (1962). Nevertheless, the term seems to have become established. See
generally CAvERs, supra note 3, at 98-102.
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an interest in the application of those policies. In making these
determinations the court should employ the ordinary processes of
construction and interpretation.
2. [False conflict step] If the court finds that one state has an
interest in the application of its policy in the circumstances of the
case and the other has none, it should apply the law of the only
interested state.
3. [Conflict avoidance step] If the court finds an apparent con-
flict between the interests of the two states it should reconsider. A
more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest
of one state or the other may avoid conflict.
4. [Forum law application step] If, upon reconsideration, the court
finds that a conflict between the legitimate interests of the two states
is unavoidable, it should apply the law of the forum.
9 8
As stated above, there is no indication, other than various cita-
tions in Reich to works of those advocating a governmental-interest
approach,99 that the court is adopting this formula for determining
choice of law problems. However, a comparison with the process
used by the court yields the impression that the governmental-in-
terest theory had some influence on the method of deciding this
case.' 00 The California court, if it can be said to be following this
formula, was required to go only as far as the false conflict step to
decide the case. Adhering to the policy analysis step the court
inquired into the policies behind the laws relating to damages for
wrongful death' 0 ' and determined that only the policy of Ohio would
be furthered by application of its law. 0 2 Accordingly it applied the
law of that state-the false conflict step.
0 3
98 Professor Currie supplied this summary for inclusion in E. CHIATUAVM,
E. GRISWOLD, W. RrEESE, & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF
LAws 477-78 (5th ed. 1964).
Professor Currie is not alone in his approach to decision of conflicts cases
by inquiry into the terms and purposes of laws and whether the respective
purposes of each would be served by its application. Professor Currie's enun-
ciation of this approach was chosen because the court made reference in the
Reich decision to his writings and because of the workable, concise summary
available.
There is a high degree of similarity between Currie's approach and that
of Professor David Cavers, whose work, THE CHOICE-or-LAw PROCESS (1965),
the Reich court also cites. 67 A.C. at 563, 432 P.2d at 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
Professor Cavers admits at page 89 of his book that their approaches are
identical so far as a "false conflict" case is concerned. Cavers goes on to cite
several other conflicts scholars who he believes would take a similar approach.
CAvERs, supra note 3, at 91-92.
99 CAvEEs, supra note 3; Currie, Essays, supra note 3.
100 See text accompanying notes 83-98 supra. It cannot be doubted that
at least one member of the court, the author of the Reich opinion, Chief
Justice Traynor, is favorably impressed by Currie's approach. See Traynor,
Is This Conflict Really Necessary, 37 Tax. L. REV. 657, 667-68 (1957).
101 Text accompanying notes 86-93 supra. It should be noted that under
the governmental-interest approach, contrary to the lex loci rule, there is no
requirement that the laws of a single jurisdiction control all issues in a case.
Thus the Reich court implies that the laws of the place of the wrong may
control issues having to do with conduct within that state even though they
might not control the damages issue. 67 A.C. at 565, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal.
Rptr. at 35.
102 Text accompanying notes 86-93 supra.
103 Text accompanying notes 94-95 supra. The reader of the Reich opin-
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Whether California will adopt the fourth step in the formula,
which calls for application of the law of the forum where a true
conflict exists, cannot be answered on the basis of decisional law in
California at this time. There is however, in the case of Bernkrant v.
Fowler,10 4 some evidence that the California courts will not mechan-
ically implement the forum law application step without first at-
tempting to apply the conflict avoidance step. That is, the courts will
not automatically apply their own law when at first glance there
appears to be a genuine conflict between California's interest in
applying its law and that of another state in applying its law. Rather,
it appears that the courts will attempt to reconcile and avoid the
conflict by a careful examination of the facts to discover whether the
connections with the policies behind the respective laws are signifi-
cant or relatively inconsequential.
Bernkrant involved a contract rather than a tort, but the approach
can be analogized to the tort situation. Involved was a conflict be-
tween the Nevada and California statutes of frauds. California re-
quired that a contract to make a will be in writing.10 5 The Cal-
ifornia court determined that Nevada law would not require a writ-
ten instrument in this case.10 6 The contract in question was made
in Nevada but the estate was being administered in California.
0 7
The court subordinated California's interest in preventing fraudulent
claims against estates' 0 8 to Nevada's interest in upholding the ex-
pectation of the parties that the laws of Nevada would control the
validity of the contract made in Nevada.' 0 9 Looking at the practicali-
ties of the matter, the opinion points out that the opposite con-
clusion would require parties similarly situated to examine and com-
ply with the statute of frauds of every state where the testator might
ion should not be misled by two sentences which, although supporting the
justice of the decision, contribute little to the governmental-interest approach,
if it can be said that such is being applied. The court stated, "A defendant
cannot reasonably complain when damages are assessed in accordance with
the law of his domicile and plaintiffs receive no more than they would had
they been injured at home." 67 A.C. at 565, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at
35. This statement, although certainly making a logical point at this juncture,
is based on one of Professor Cavers' "principles of preference" (CAvERs, supra
note 3, at 122, 153-57) which were developed to be applied only when a true
conflict exists (Id. at 137).
The court also made this statement: "Defendant's liability should not be
limited when no party to the action is from a state limiting liability and when
defendant, therefore, would have secured insurance, if any, without any such
limit in mind." 67 A.C. at 565, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35. This
statement is similar to arguments presented by Professor Ehrenzweig in his
writings. See A. EmHmzwEiG, TR sATsE oN = CoN_.cT or LAws 580 (1962).
But see Cavers, Some of Ehrenzweig's Choice-of-Law Generalizations, 18
OKLA. L. REV. 357, 364 (1965); Currie, Book Review, 1964 DUxn L.J. 424, 432
(criticizing Ehrenzweig's argument).
104 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
105 Id. at 593, 360 P.2d at 908, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 590-91, 360 P.2d at 906-07, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 266-67.
108 Id. at 594-95, 360 P.2d at 909, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
109 Id. It should be noted that the theory of validation, or upholding the
expectations of the parties, plays a much smaller role in torts cases than in
contracts. See text accompanying note 118 infra.
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die domiciled.110 Despite this indication that California may apply
the conflict avoidance step, there is not a sufficient basis in present
California law to allow a rational prediction as to the adoption of
the forum law application step of the governmental-interest theory.
Conclusion
The lex loci delicti rule failed to provide required flexibility,
and its mechanical application to all choice of law cases in tort with
multistate contacts at times created unjust results."' It is sub-
mitted that the California courts took a step in the right direction
by overruling cases relying on the lex loci rule. The courts are now
free to state the true bases for their decisions without having to
reason within the bounds of the exceptions of the lex loci rule."
2
However, this freedom may create new problems for the courts.
Determination of the bases upon which courts are to choose between
application of several possible laws will not be simple. A difficult
task sometimes awaits the court which must ferret out the policy or
policies underlying each of those laws and determine whether those
policies would be furthered in the case at hand."13 An even more
difficult task arises in determining when and how to avoid an appar-
ent conflict between two or more states by giving a moderate or
restrained interpretation to the policy of one."
14
This is in direct contrast to the simplicity, ease of application and
relative certainty provided by the lex loci rule."5 As a result of
the difficult inquiry into policy and the conflict avoidance pro-
cedure, results may be even less uniform under the governmental-
interest approach than under lex loci." 6 However, if courts continue
to assess the contacts as they existed at the time of the tort there
will be little advantage to forum shopping." 7  Furthermore, the
lack of predictability or certainty of result is less significant in the
110 Id. at 595, 360 P.2d at 909, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 269. See also People v. One
1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957), a case which employs
a similar approach.
Professor Currie has termed the court's analysis in Bernkrant a brilliant
example of a moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy behind the
law and of the circumstances under which that law must be applied to ef-
fectuate the policy. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CoNTEmp.
PROB. 754, 757 (1963).
111 See note 3 supra.
112 Currie, Survival, supra note 3; Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considera-
tions in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267, 289 (1966).
In many cases the result arrived at under the governmental-interest ap-
proach will be the same as under the lex loci rule since the application of
the law of the place of injury may further some legitimate interest of that
state. See, e.g., Schneider v. Schimmels, 1 Civ. No. 23857 (Calif. Ct. of Appeals,
1st Dist., filed Aug. 1, 1966) (the first case applying the Reich method).
113 Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law, Current Doctrine and "True Rules," 49
CALIw. L. REV. 240, 246-48 (1961); Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict
of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 463 (1960).
114 Note 113 supra.
115 See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
116 Note 113 supra.
117 Note 89 supra.
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torts field than in other areas of the law such as contracts, since
the commission of most torts is unintentional and without advance
reliance on the eventual determination of the parties' resulting legal
rights.
118
It is submitted that the California court reached the proper result
in the Reich case. The court restricted its discussion to that re-
quired to decide the case. The decision of the case was not difficult
once the lex loci obstacle was removed. It is perhaps unfortunate
for future courts and California practitioners that the decision does
not set forth any complete set of guidelines for the resolution of
future cases. However, the reticence of the California court is under-
standable in view of the wide disagreement among writers in the
field as to the proper approach to replace the lex loci rule in tort
choice of law," 9 the difficulty in formulating a general scheme with
sufficient flexibility to cover all situations, 120 and the general con-
fusion which has resulted from attempts of other courts to dictate
such a scheme.' 2 ' Perhaps choice of law with its myriad potential
factual situations is an area of the law which is better dealt with on
a case by case method.
22
Despite the disadvantages of the governmental-interest approach
the Reich court has laid the foundation for a much more rational
choice of law method than was possible under the lex loci rule.2 3 It
seems that with the adoption of the governmental-interest approach
the chances are much less that there will be a recurrence of the
type of unjust result which the Victor case produced.
Alan E. Burchett*
118 Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 679, 687 (1963).
119 Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 754,
758 (1963).
120 See Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARv. L. REV. 881, 885 (1951).
121 See Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 Dunc
L.J. 1, in Cuym, EssAys, supra note 3, at 690.
122 See generally CAvERs, supra note 3, at 110, Cavers, Changing, supra
note 27, at 733 n.5; Currie, Notes, supra note 42, at 179; Reese, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1251, 1253 (1963).
123 See Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 23, 203 A.2d 796, 806
(1964), where a Pennsylvania court under similar circumstances stated: "We
are at the beginning of the development of a workable, fair and flexible ap-
proach to choice of law which will become more certain as it is tested and
further refined when applied to specific cases before our courts."
* Member, Third Year Class.
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